

Government Checking Government

How Performance Measures Expand Distributive Politics†

Anthony M. Bertelli
Associate Professor
Department of Public Administration and Policy
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
Senior Lecturer in Politics
School of Social Sciences
University of Manchester

and

Peter John*
Hallsworth Chair of Governance
School of Social Sciences
University of Manchester

*Contact Author

Contact Information:

Politics
School of Social Sciences
University of Manchester
Oxford Road
Manchester
M13 9PL
UNITED KINGDOM
Email: peter.john@manchester.ac.uk
Phone: +44(0)161 275 0798
Fax: +44(0)161 275 0793

†We thank Steve Kelman and Andy Whitford for helpful comments. Soo-jin Kim and Aubrey Scully provided invaluable research assistance.

Government Checking Government

How Performance Measures Expand Distributive Politics

This paper argues that distributive politics operates in a variety of contexts in which governments seek to check the behavior of other governments. We provide a novel theoretical account of performance measurement systems as political discipline mechanisms even when measures are compiled by formally independent administrative agencies. We test the implications of our theory using a dataset of performance ratings in English local government assessed between 2002-2006. Results suggest that political influence favors swing voters, and local authorities sharing party affiliation with the incumbent central government are favored over those controlled by the opposition. Evidence further suggests that the independent rater in our empirical case is influenced through ties between its membership and the local authorities that it regulates. Our theoretical argument and findings have implications for many national and international contexts.

With ever-increasing regularity, the performance of regulators and public service providers is rated as good, poor, or something between. In the United States, performance ratings are central to the “No Child Left Behind” legislation, which relies on close performance assessment of public schools. Local governments in the United Kingdom are evaluated on various aspects of their performance by an independent authority established by Parliament. The distinctive quality of these arrangements is that politicians at one level design incentives to influence the behavior of politicians at another level—government checking government. From budgetary security to reputational enhancement, benefits flow from positive performance evaluations all the way to voters. While a great deal of research in the fields of public administration, public policy, and economics has examined such performance assessments in terms of their formal objectives of enhancing policy effectiveness, we contend that these literatures ignore an essential element of politics. Performance measurements represent what we call a political discipline mechanism, and constitute an increasingly powerful dimension of distributive politics. We present new theory and empirical evidence that supports the salience of this emergent form of political influence.

Why are performance evaluations politically important? Ratings give a clear signal to citizens that regulatory authority or service provision is recognized as going well or poorly, justifying or shaping their own personal perceptions of government performance. Because these ratings provide qualitative judgments about organizations with an electoral connection, they provide a mechanism for voters to assess the policy responsiveness of their incumbents. With the geographic distribution of benefits flowing from the ratings at stake, it is likely ratings are an increasingly important feature of distributive politics.

The pork-barrel politics literature concentrates on the direct influence of legislators in bringing government expenditures to their districts (e.g. Ferejohn, 1974; Stein and Bickers, 1995; Rundquist and Carsey, 2002; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002, Golden and Picci 2008, Lyne 2008). Politicians often place the performance evaluation process at arms

length to make the objectivity and technocratic competence of ratings credible. Do the incentives inherent in distributive politics influence outcomes produced by independent agencies? Empirical evidence suggests that distributive politics applies to expenditure programs administered by formally independent agencies (i.e., Bickers and Stein 2004), but scholars have devoted strikingly little attention to the effect of pork-barrel incentives on programs that demand objectivity as the basis for their legitimacy. We develop a novel theory of the distributive politics of performance ratings as political discipline mechanisms, providing statistical evidence for our claims in the case of the performance evaluation of English local governments by an independent agency, the Audit Commission, known as the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) administered between 2002-2006. Using stereotype logistic regression, we provide substantial support for the claim that distributive politics operates when governments check governments through performance measurement schemes. Our theory and findings provide a new way of looking at performance systems and have profound implications for scholars of bureaucratic and legislative politics at the local, national, and supra-national levels of government in both domestic and comparative settings.

In what follows, we present our theory of the distributive politics of performance measurement in a general setting. We then turn to our empirical context, explaining English local government and the CPA scheme. Our data and statistical methods are then presented, followed by the results of our analysis. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research and public policy.

1 The Politics of Performance

The nature of governmental performance measurement as a political discipline mechanism may be understood through a series of bilateral relationships that when taken together permit distributive politics to enter what is commonly seen as a technocratic scheme. First, a policy coordination problem arises from the desire of a superordinate government to monitor the regulatory behavior and service provision of a subordinate

government. As in a contractual setting, the subordinate controls a set of actions that induce outcomes that are of interest to and have electoral consequences for the superordinate. The subordinate also holds private information about the process by which those outcomes are generated and, in our distributive context, about local conditions. By contrast, the superordinate has formal rulemaking authority over the subordinate, which includes the creation of third-party organizations for regulating the latter.

In our empirical context, the superordinate is the U.K. central government, an executive authority comprised of the prime minister and cabinet that holds rulemaking authority through secure legislative majorities. The subordinate is the English local authority, a multi-purpose service provision and regulatory authority, that is overseen by local politicians with their own electoral mandate and majoritarian basis for control. In the U.S., the programs created by Congress such as supplemental education services for children in failing schools under the “No Child Left Behind” Act create mandates for a state or local government that yield the monitoring problem we describe (i.e., Burch, Steinberg, and Donovan 2007). The European Union delegates the administration of targeted European funds to a member state that the latter may employ for national political purposes (i.e., Hooghe and Marks 2001).

Our claim is that analyzing a system of performance measurement is enhanced by taking into account electoral incentives that confront both governments. Regarding multi-task performance incentives, one component of the economics literature on performance measures suggests that while the measures employed in assessing agent (subordinate) performance are imperfect, the principal (superordinate) understands how those measures relate to true performance on the organization’s objective (see Prendergast 1999). Another permits the principal to learn how the agent responds to the performance measures and for the principal to modify the measures over time as such “gaming” behavior on the agent’s part is realized (Courty and Marschke 2003). While vague indicators of performance—such as the “star rating” assessment system employed in our empirical case—are used to solve

policy coordination problems, the fact that the principal in our context are politicians add an additional wrinkle to the dilemma.

Because political agency relationships exist between voters and politicians, the principal cannot credibly commit to a technocratic performance measurement scheme when the measures it generates can influence its electoral fortunes. This type of commitment problem is well known in the literature and is addressed institutionally by the creation of an independent, third party organization (cf. North and Weingast 1989; Keefer and Stasavage 2003), that in our case would undertake the performance evaluations. This delegation transfers the superordinate's formal authority to regulate the subordinate to a third party, the rater. The Audit Commission, which plays this role in our empirical example from England, was created in 1983 and expanded the traditional function of auditing public expenditure to review performance and efficiency (Moran 2005, 253).

Two challenges to the credibility of this commitment to objective performance measurement arise in a context where both superordinate and subordinate are politicians. First, the superordinate must have the structural constraints to permit a credible commitment to the rater. In separation-of-powers systems, the existence of multiple veto players provide such constraints, i.e., the U.S. Congress can delegate authority to an independent regulatory commission whose members may be appointed, but not removed, by the president. However, in unitary systems such as the U.K., parliament always retains the authority to rescind or modify the authority granted to the rater and judicial review is traditionally weak (Strøm 2003, 267).

This parliament-centered lawmaking authority provides an avenue for political influence of the rater. With Arnold (1979, 21), we assume that the rating agency is risk-averse and wishes to avoid declines in their total budget, which would occur with the loss of ratings programs. In the U.K., arms-length agencies such as the Audit Commission are independent by degree rather than having absolute freedom. Parliament can veto the ratings or transfer them to a new independent agency. Nonetheless, submitting to political

pressure is costly to the agency, which may lose its reputation for even-handedness. It is this reputation for objective performance evaluation, a reputation that parliament wishes to maintain. Given this tradeoff between credibility and political influence, we anticipate that influence is likely to be observed on the margin (see Khemani 2007).

A second challenge arises in designing the rater. To maintain its technocratic effectiveness and legitimacy with those it regulates, the rater may embed the influence of a key regulated interest group within its organization. This strategy provides legitimacy for the rater in the eyes of the rated as well as a degree of technocratic competence in the substantive context in which ratings are assigned. The interest may be a requirement enacted by the superordinate in, for example, statutory language (i.e., the deck stacking claim in McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987), or an administrative practice that develops as the rater goes about its business. In our empirical context, the Audit Commission's main regulated interest is local government itself. The Audit Commission Act of 1998 currently authorizes appointments to the commission and states that appointments "shall be made after consultation with such organisations and other bodies as appear to the Secretary of State to be appropriate" (Part 1, Section 5). In practice, this consultation has given way to actual representation of current and past local authority associates—elected local politicians, appointees, and bureaucrats—on the commission itself, yielding a quasi-corporatism that provides an avenue of influence for local electoral concerns to be represented in the allocation of performance scores. For the superordinate, this representation works to neuter potential opposition to performance rating scheme.

The key difference between incentives designed to impact the performance of the subordinate government and those discussed widely in the case of a bureaucratic agent (i.e., Huber and Shipan 2002; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987) is that the subordinate has its own electoral connection to a subset of the superordinate's voters. These separate electoral connections have different consequences in different systems. In the U.S., for example, evidence suggests that voter support in state legislative elections is impacted by

state legislators' policy responsiveness (Hogan 2004), while in the U.K., local elections in aggregate are seen as a referendum on the governing party's overall competence (Miller 1988). In the 2007 English local elections, for instance, Conservative candidates won more than 800 seats, giving them their greatest level of local representation since the late 1970s.¹ This was widely seen as a humiliation of the incumbent Labour government and Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Evidence suggests also that incumbent politicians in local authorities receiving poor overall performance ratings are punished with lower vote shares (cf. James and John 2006; Revelli 2008). While the incumbent central government is not overly harmed or assisted by the outcome of any particular local race, it does have an incentive to see that the overall results are favorable.

We have claimed that the policy coordination problem that is addressed by performance measurement generates incentives for the principal politician to influence the rater in its assignment of evaluations for the subordinate on the margin, because strong influence would diminish the objectivity of the rating scheme. In the context of English local government, we have seen the overall result of local elections has an impact on the national prospects for the governing party. At the margin, MPs in constituencies that share geography with local governments may find the results of individual races to be a signal about their own electoral fortunes. Consequently, we claim that the signal that local elections provide for each MP presents a target for influence on performance ratings at the margin. Studies of distributive politics focus on the choice between rewarding core supporters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Stokes 2005; Dixit and Londregan 1996) or voters located in swing seats (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). We thus test these competing claims in examining whether evidence of distributive politics exists in the performance-rating scheme we discuss. In what follows, we discuss our empirical context in greater detail before presenting our hypotheses.

¹ BBC Webpage, "New Labour Ending - Cameron."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6628199.stm

3 Performance measurement in English local government

England has a unitary system of government subject to parliamentary control. Local government consists of multi-functional organizations administering an array of services from education, to the environment, to public safety. Elected local politicians in 34 counties, 47 non-metropolitan unitary councils, and 69 metropolitan authorities (as well 238 districts not analyzed here) exercise limited discretion in implementing statutes subject to strict budgetary and legal control from parliament. It is the monitoring problem inherent in exerting such parliamentary control that creates incentives for the implementation of performance measurement. Such assessments began in the 1990s with measures developed by the central but independent body, the Audit Commission, which has been in existence since 1983.² A review of these measures conducted in 2001-2002 led to the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), which created a simple five-point rating scale (poor, weak, fair, good and excellent).³ To generate CPA scores, six-member inspection teams analyze performance along several dimensions including organizational activity, resource use, and service provision.

CPA ratings at the extreme ends of the scale—either poor or excellent—are highlighted in the media and are a source of local embarrassment (Game 2006, 468). Concern from lagging ratings is reinforced by central government interventions designed to reform management in the poorly performing authority. Key benefits to local authorities from a good CPA score are public recognition for quality service and regulation, favorable treatment by central government, and access to more funding streams (Haubrich and McLean 2006). A poor score can have electoral consequences, as in the case of Hull,

² The Local Government Finance Act 1982 enabled the Audit Commission.

³ The annual use of resources assessment is based on assessment by a local auditor and comprises five themes: financial standing, reporting, and management, internal control mechanisms, and value for money. Service provision assessments are either performed by other inspectorates (in the case of children and young people, adult social care and benefits) or by the Commission (as with housing, environment, culture and, where appropriate, fire). The Commission uses national performance information combined with inspection judgments, where they exist, to assess environment, housing and cultural services. A “direction of travel” assessment indicates the Audit Commission’s assessment of how likely the council is to improve in the near future (Audit Commission 2005).

designated as England's worst performing local authority, and where the Liberal Democrats gained control from Labour incumbents.⁴ Statistical evidence suggests such electoral consequences are systematic (James and John 2007; Revelli 2008).

4 Hypotheses

When our theory of the distributive politics of performance measurement is placed into the foregoing context, several hypotheses can be constructed. As local election results provide a signal to the central government about their electoral fortunes in the constituencies, we relate success in local elections to distributive political choices at the national level. We also examine hypotheses that address the role that local government as an interest group has on the decisionmaking of the independent rater, the Audit Commission. As we detail in the following section, local authorities (where local elections are held) and parliamentary constituencies (represented by MPs) are not geographically contiguous. Thus, our hypotheses are written to respect the intersection of these units of political geography.

We begin with the core (Cox and McCubbins 1986) and swing (Dixit and Londregan 1996) hypotheses implied by theories of distributive politics:

H1: *Distributive Politics (Core)*: When the signal from local elections suggests that marginal (safe) government MPs become safer (more marginal), the probability of high CPA scores increases (decreases). Correspondingly, as local elections turn more favorably (less favorably) for the government, local authorities that are geographically contiguous with opposition held parliamentary constituencies have a lower (higher) probability of receiving high CPA scores.

H2: *Distributive Politics (Swing)*: When the signal from local elections suggests that marginal (safe) government MPs become safer (more marginal), the probability of high CPA scores decreases (increases). Correspondingly, as local elections turn more favorably (less favorably) for the government, local authorities that are geographically contiguous with opposition held parliamentary constituencies have a higher (lower) probability of receiving high CPA scores.

⁴ See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/humber/4099063.stm>

Given that local elected councils share or do not share partisanship with the incumbent central government, we anticipate that distributive politics will manifest itself differently depending on local partisan control.

H3: Local Authority Partisanship: The probability of receiving higher (lower) CPA scores is higher (lower) when a local authority is under government (opposition) control.

Local government is the primary interest group in the performance measurement scheme, and rules for the composition of the Audit Commission permit ties between its membership and the local authorities it regulates. This has two testable implications.

H4: Quasi-corporatism: Ties between local authorities and members of the Audit Commission significantly impact the magnitude of CPA scores.

H5: Overall Rating Inflation: Overall, the probability of that a local authority will receive a CPA score in higher categories (indicating good performance) is higher than the probability of receiving a CPA score in lower categories (indicating poor performance).

We now describe our data, measures, and statistical model for testing the foregoing hypotheses.

5 An Empirical Test for Performance Ratings

To test our hypotheses, we use data from the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA), an annual assessment of the 148 principal local authorities in England.⁵ CPA data are available online from the Audit Commission.⁶ Because our claims deal with both national and local political influence and parliamentary constituencies are typically located within the boundaries of local authorities, we used a scheme to match these geographic areas to create our unit of analysis, the local authority–parliamentary constituency (LA-PC) dyad.⁷ For continuous variables measured at the local authority level, we approximate their value in the dyad via a weight comprised of the number of census

⁵ These include counties, metropolitan districts, London boroughs, and unitary councils.

⁶ <http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/CPA/>

⁷ This address information was retrieved from the University of Manchester's *GeoConvert*, an online geocoding system available at <http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/>.

addresses in the Westminster constituency that are also located in the local authority, that is, the number of census addresses within the LA-PC dyad. Weighting is performed multiplicatively for continuous variables, while dichotomous indicator variables take the values that prevail in the dyad at the time of measurement.

5.1 Dependent Variable

These dyads are repeatedly observed over the years in which the CPA was administered, 2002-2006. Our dependent variable is *CPA score*, the publicized rating, which takes values between one and four. The dataset includes 3,230 dyad-year observations.⁸ In 2006, the scores available were changed to a “star system” with a scale ranging from zero to four, but the basic five categories remained intact. To retain information for the entire period, we combined categories 1 and 2 at the low end of each scale into a single category (labeled 1) and the CPA’s 2002-2005 categories 3-5 were recoded to 2-4, producing the four category scale analyzed as our dependent variable.⁹

5.2 Electoral Variables

Since Labour was the central government incumbent party throughout the sample period, we code the political variables to reflect its electoral advantage. *Government Local Council* (GOVLC) takes a value of one if the Labour party was in control of the local council represented in the dyad during the observation year. *Government MP* (GOVMP) takes a value of one if a Labour party MP represented the dyad in the year of observation. Consequently, opposition constituencies are considered those represented by members of the Conservative, Liberal Democrat, or other parties.

⁸The total number of dyad-year observations are as follows. In 2002 and 2003, 643 dyads were included, while there were 642 in 2004, 640 in 2005, and 662 in 2006.

⁹As a check on the validity of this recoding scheme, we estimated our model using the five-category scale only for the years 2000-2005. That model had 2568 observations and a model $\chi^2 = 171.86$ (16 df). As in the model displayed in table 2, this regression suggested ordinality for the CPA scale ($\phi_1 < \phi_2 < \phi_3 < \phi_4$), though the parallel regression assumption was violated in this analysis as well. The results were substantively similar, as can be seen from the table of predicted probabilities (corresponding to table 3) included in the appendix (not for publication). The general patterns reflected in table 3 are present, supporting the validity of our recoding.

Government vote share in local elections (LCLABV) is measured as the percent vote share for Labour across all votes cast in each local election held during the years 2002-2006. These results are drawn from the annual *Local Elections Handbook* produced by Michael Thrasher and Colin Rallings of the University of Plymouth. Where multi-member electoral districts are in place, these volumes, and consequently our data, include the vote share of the highest placed candidate for each party. Local elections occur at different times for different councils. Some councils face elections every four years (e.g. London and the counties); others elect a third of their councilors every year with no election years one in four. We report vote shares for election years and include this figure for each subsequent year in which no election is held. This has the advantage that we predict performance according the best information available to the incumbent, which includes past as well as current elections.

Combining the British Election Survey (BES) categories of ultra-marginal, fairly marginal, and fairly safe yields our measure of parliamentary marginality. Ultra-marginal seats have a majority of 4.9 per cent in the previous election, fairly marginal represent 5-9.9 percent majorities, and fairly safe were characterized by 10-14.9 percent majorities to the victorious candidate (Norris 2005). Thus our measure of a *Marginal MP* (MPMARG) is an indicator variable equal to one when the result of the 2001 parliamentary election was less than a 15 percent majority vote share for the winner. This measure is slightly more than the conventional "10 per cent marginals" (Curtice et al. 1982, 269) in British electoral research at the national level, but reflects an empirical observation that government vote share in local elections reflects similar patterns in less than 15 percent majority seats and when compared with seats having 15 percent or greater majorities.¹⁰

¹⁰ Specifically, a descriptive examination of Labour vote share across the BES categories for the sample period shows that in ultra-marginal, fairly marginal, and fairly safe seats, Liberal Democrat local councils were associated with lower mean Labour vote shares in local elections. Labour did worse in this case than when the local council was controlled by the Conservatives or a coalition. However, these distinctions evaporate in very safe and ultra-safe seats. Since the BES categories themselves arbitrary, we create marginal indicator as specified above. Nonetheless, we estimated

5.3 Rater Variables

The Department for Communities and Local Government appoints members of the Audit Commission following consultation with key stakeholders. If an Audit Commission member has ties to the local authority being rated, those ties may provide a channel for private information regarding or favoritism toward (or against) the local authority that is reflected in the CPA score. We examine four types of connections where a past connection indicates membership during the year before the CPA was announced. As the CPA for a current year is announced in December, we denote in each case current year membership as service from December 1 of the previous year through November 30 of the current year.

AC current member of local council takes a value of one when an incumbent on a local council in the dyad is also on the audit commission. *AC current formal position in local authority* is a dichotomous indicator for current positions public bodies located in the dyad and subject to appointment by the local authority. For example, Dame Denise Platt currently serves on the Independent Review Board for Cheshire Fire and Rescue Services resulting in a coding of one for this variable in each dyad in which Cheshire is a geographic component. *AC Past formal position in local authority* indicates a similar past affiliation. *AC past bureaucrat in local authority* is coded one when a current audit commissioner previously held a career bureaucratic position in any local authority in the dyad. Steve Bundred, for example, served as Director of Finance for the London Borough of Camden yielding a coding of one in dyads including that local authority. *AC current bureaucrat in local authority* indicates similar current roles and was omitted as the reference category.

the model with 10 percent marginals as a check on validity; it yielded a significant model $\chi^2 = 370.71$ (17 df) and similar results regarding ordinality and the reasonableness behind the choice of the stereotype logistic regression model. The results were substantively similar, with differences in predicted probabilities from maximum through minimum values of government vote share generally positive for categories 1, 2, and 3 (1, 2) and negative for a CPA rating of 4 (3,4) in the conditions listed in panel (a) (panel(b)) of table 3. Predicted probabilities were similar in magnitude to those presented in table 3.

5.4 Control Variables

We control for the most prominent known factors that influence performance ratings in English local government. Local authorities serving larger populations receive higher scores because they more efficiently provide services (Andrews, et al. 2006). To measure the size of a local authority, we use its total *population* in thousands of persons drawn from the 2001 Census. As noted above, this variable is weighted by multiplying the percentage of census addresses in the LA-PC geographic intersection to yield our relevant dyadic measure.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Authorities with more constraints on performance arising from difficult social and economic conditions receive lower performance scores than do equivalent authorities in more affluent areas (Andrews, et al. 2005; Haubrich and McLean 2006). To measure the well-being of the population, we include the 2004 *Index of Multiple Deprivation*, an official composite measure based on seven types of deprivation (CLG 2008). As with population, this index is further weighted to generate a LA-PC dyad approximation. Summary statistics for all variables included in the model appear in Table 1.

5.5 Statistical Model and Specification

We employ a stereotype logistic regression (SLR) model (Anderson 1984)¹¹ to estimate the conditional probability that the Audit Commission assigns a CPA rating at each of the four levels. This estimator is particularly suited to the rating problem that faces the Audit Commission when assigning CPA scores, where the audit commission “processes an indeterminate amount of information before providing [its] *judgement* of the grade,” our CPA score (Anderson 1984, 2, emphasis original). In assessing local authorities, the Audit Commission processes information as if it “has loose stereotypes for each category” in the CPA scale “and that a new case for categorization is fitted into the most appropriate

¹¹Estimation is via maximum likelihood using the `-slogit-` command for STATA 10.0.

category” (Anderson 1984, 6). The model thus incorporates different distributions for each category. These distributions differ only in mean values, and a relationship between the dependent variable and covariates is determined by these means. If those mean values are collinear, they are said to be one-dimensional (7). The proportional odds assumption of ordered logit models is relaxed¹² and ordinality can be empirically assessed.¹³

To capture the quasi-experimental conditions we wish to compare, we begin by specifying the following linear model:

$$CPA_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 GOVLC_{it} + \beta_2 MPMARG_{it} + \beta_3 MPGOV_{it} + \beta_4 LCLABV_{it} + [\text{Rater and Control Variables}] + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Our principal claim is that CPA scores are a component of distributive politics as they are instrumental to a distribution of resources across local authorities. With respect to equation 1, this argument states that β_4 depends on some of the regressors, namely,

$$\beta_4 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 GOVLC_{it} + \gamma_2 MPMARG_{it} + \gamma_3 MPGOV_{it} \quad (2)$$

Substituting (2) into (1) yields the equation estimated via SLR:

$$\begin{aligned} CPA_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 GOVLC_{it} + \beta_2 MPMARG_{it} + \beta_3 MPGOV_{it} + \gamma_0 LCLABV_{it} + \dots \\ & + \gamma_1 GOVLC_{it} * LCLABV_{it} + \gamma_2 MPMARG_{it} * LCLABV_{it} + \dots \\ & + \gamma_3 MPGOV_{it} * LCLABV_{it} + [\text{Rater and Control Variables}] + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3) \end{aligned}$$

Multicollinearity does not present a significant problem in this specification, with variance inflation factors at acceptable levels.¹⁴

¹²Using the more parsimonious ordered logit model, we performed a likelihood-ratio test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors are equal across categories of the dependent variable that produced a χ^2 (31 df) = 292.60, suggesting that the proportional odds assumption is inappropriate in our case.

¹³Another alternative is the multinomial logit regression model, though the Small and Hsiao (1985) test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption rejects the null of independence in two of the three categorical comparisons. Comparisons of the predictions from the SLRM and multinomial logit suggest that the SLRM does produce an improvement over the unordered model, i.e., they are highly correlated, but not perfectly so. Pairwise correlations between these predictions are .95 for Pr(CPA=1), .88 for Pr(CPA=2), .68 for Pr(CPA=3), and .93 for Pr(CPA=4).

¹⁴Variance inflation factors range from 1.01 to 4.23 with a mean of 2.37.

5.5 Ordinality of the CPA

Our SLM model can be written as follows:

$$\Pr(CPA_{it} = k) = \frac{\exp(\theta_k - \phi_k \mathbf{x}_{it} \beta)}{\sum_{j=1}^3 \exp(\theta_j - \phi_j \mathbf{x}_{it} \beta)} \quad (4)$$

where CPA_{it} is the base category and $\mathbf{x}_{it} \beta$ represents the conditional expectation of the response in equation 3. For our CPA score variable to be ordered from one through four, we should observe $\phi_1 > \hat{\phi}_2 > \hat{\phi}_3 > \phi_4$, where $\phi_4 = 0$ as CPA=4 is the reference category and $\phi_1 = 1$ for identification (Long and Freese 2006, 280). Our estimates in the full model presented in table 2 are $\hat{\phi}_2 = 0.61$ and $\hat{\phi}_3 = 0.29$ and achieve statistical significance. This evidence of ordinality is important to the efficacy of the CPA scheme. If the CPA ratings are not ordinal in our specifications, then an increase or decrease in scores might not have the intended instrumental effect on the distribution of prestige and resources among the local authorities of England.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

6 Results and Discussion

The results of the SLR model are presented in Table 2. We take the hypotheses in the order that statistics are presented in the tables. We find strong support for the quasi-corporatism hypothesis (H4) with the indicator variables for ties between the Audit Commission and a local authority in the dyad jointly significant ($\chi^2=51.82$, $p=0.000$). Commissioners having held or currently holding a formal position in a local authority have a positive influence on CPA scores when compared with currently serving bureaucrats (the reference category); but current local politicians are not significantly different all else equal. Current audit commissioners who have previously served as bureaucrats in a local authority in the dyad have a negative impact on CPA scores when compared with their current counterparts. This implies that past bureaucrats use their inside knowledge of

actual performance when rating the authorities on which they had served, yet current bureaucrats may consider doing so a breach of loyalty.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

The rightmost column of Table 2 shows a specification that omits rater variables with robust results. The inclusion of rater ties absorbs a substantial amount of variation that was captured by the fixed effect for government local council control, reducing the coefficient from 1.078 in the nested model to 0.856 in the full model. Characteristics associated with government local council control beyond these ties have a positive impact on CPA scores as the fixed effect remains significant in the full model. Moreover, the full model proved to be significantly better (Likelihood ratio= 284.07, $p < 0.001$).

The control variables in our specifications perform as expected. The negative and significant coefficient for Index of Multiple Deprivation in both models of Table 2 suggests that authorities in poorer areas face more constraints on performance than do their counterparts in wealthier communities. Dyads having local authorities with larger populations are associated with higher CPA scores as predicted. The positive and increasing values of the year fixed effects suggest an increasing trend in CPA scores since the base year of 2002.

Table 2 also shows that the coefficient for the variable indicating a dyad contains a constituency with a marginal MP is significant and positive, providing preliminary evidence that the swing version of the distributive politics hypothesis (H2) is favored over the core version (H1). Dyads containing marginal MPs and local authorities controlled by copartisans of the central government are likely to receive somewhat lower scores as evidenced by the coefficient on this interaction term, suggesting that political tradeoffs involving the assignment of CPA scores are influenced by the partisan control of local authorities. Nonetheless, a much fuller picture of the hypothesized distributive politics effects is provided in Table 3. Because our measure of the signal that local elections provide for the central government's electoral viability is the vote share of the government (Labour)

party in the local election, we generate predicted probabilities for the minimum Labour (4.4 percent), mean (31.7 percent) and maximum (64.4 percent) vote share in the sample. Taken together, these results suggest significant support for the swing hypothesis (H2).

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Table 3 is divided into eight regions, four in panel (a), which contains predicted probabilities for cases when a local authority in the dyad is under the control of the government party (Labour). Panel (b) presents predicted probabilities for dyads with local governments under opposition party (Conservative or Liberal Democrat) control. Cell 1, for example, in the top right corner of panel (a) represents the condition where the dyad contains a constituency having a marginal MP and a local authority under government control. Probabilities for each CPA category for low, mean, and high values of Labour vote share (LCLABV in equation 3) appear in the individual cells. The rows marked Δ L-H present the difference in predicted probabilities between the minimum and maximum Labour vote share.

The swing hypothesis implies a negative impact on the probability of high scores as the government's electoral security increases. As noted, the focus of media, public, and policymaking attention is on extreme scores. Looking at the difference in predicted probabilities between the minimum and maximum Labour vote share (in the rows marked Δ L-H), we observe negative changes for the probability of the highest and positive changes for the lowest category of CPA score throughout panel (a). In panel (b), those negative changes extend to the highest two categories (CPA = 3 and CPA = 4). In cells one and five, a marginal government MP in the dyad receives a signal from the local electorate that he or she is less marginal as local Labour vote share increases, whereas in cells two and six, a safe government MP gets safer with increasing local Labour vote share. In both cases, the swing hypothesis would predict negative changes in the predicted probability of high scores as safety increases, and this is precisely what we uncover in our estimates. The intuition behind these results is that as MPs become safer, the need for an electoral boost from high

performing local authorities is reduced, and the credible commitment to provide objective scores can be maintained.

Cells three and seven provide further evidence supporting the swing hypothesis: as marginal opposition MPs tend toward the government (as government vote share increases), the probability of high scores drops. Likewise, in cells four and eight, as safe opposition MPs become more marginal, the probability of high scores decreases. Intuitively, these MPs are being punished with lower performance scores for geographically contiguous local authorities as they may assist government candidates in a forthcoming national election. In sum, swing voters are targets for the type of distributive politics the CPA scheme encompasses.

The local authority partisanship hypothesis (H3) is supported by our results. This can be most easily be seen by considering CPA categories three and four collectively as high performance ratings. H3 anticipates that given the negative impact on the probability of higher scores as Labour vote share increases shown above, this impact is more negative when the opposition controls a local authority in the dyad. Comparing $\Delta L-H$ for categories three and four in cell one, which is under opposition control, (-0.106) to that in cell five (-0.145), we see evidence supporting H3. The remaining comparisons likewise provide support: cells two (-0.101) versus six (-0.132), three (-0.114) versus seven (-0.152), cell four (-0.101) versus eight (-0.139).

Finally, the overall rating inflation hypothesis that all local authorities will have a greater probability of being above than below average is supported in Table 3. In all cells, the probability of a CPA in category three is greater than 50 percent and is always greater than the probability of the adjacent score of two. In nearly all cells, the probability of the highest CPA score exceeds that for the lowest score. Related comparisons of the joint probability mass in CPA categories three and four with that for scores one and two provide further support for H3. Approximately eighty percent of local authorities under government control receive scores of three or four. When the opposition controls local

authorities, that figure is lower, ranging from 65 to 72 percent. Overall, the results provide substantial support for our claims regarding the distributive politics of performance measurement.

8 Conclusion

We have argued that distributive politics extends well beyond deals made in legislative allocations of expenditures, the classic form of pork barrel, reaching into the decisions of superordinate governments in creating political discipline mechanisms to check the actions of subordinate governments. The mechanism that has been our focus is performance measurement, which has implications for the flow of benefits to geographic locations and the voters that reside in them. We found empirical evidence for five claims in data for the CPA assessment of English local authorities between 2002-2006. Political influence appears to impact swing voters via the CPA scheme, and local authorities under the control of the central government's party are favored over those controlled by the opposition. The independent rater in the scheme, the Audit Commission, is influenced via ties between its membership and the local authorities that it regulates. These findings combine to suggest substantial evidence of a scheme of political discipline rather than technocratic policy evaluation.

A primary implication of our analysis for students of distributive politics is that the phenomenon has broadened in its reach as governments create political discipline mechanisms in various forms. Because performance regimes rest under the auspices of scientific measurement and agency independence, it is no surprise that they have escaped the attention of students of distributive politics. Yet performance measures are ubiquitous and often instrumental to the distribution of resources. Citizens want to see good performance from their local agencies so they may attribute blame to poor performance and reward to good scores.

There are many instances in which superordinate governments (or even non-governmental organizations) seek to check the actions of subordinates that have an

electoral connection. Consider the evaluative schemes imposed on borrower nations by the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (e.g., Thacker 1999; Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008). We believe that our case study has implications for a wider set of government-on-government relationships in a variety of national and international settings, and future work should attempt to find evidence of distributive politics in other performance measurement contexts as well as other instances in which governments create mechanisms for checking other governments. Finally, while we have presented a theoretical account of such relationships, our work is an initial attempt to characterize a wider set of phenomena. More theoretical leverage can be gained, and future scholarship should engage these questions more fully.

References

- Anderson, J A. 1984. "Regression and Ordered Categorical Variables." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological)* 46(1): 1-30.
- Andrews, Rhys, George A. Boyne, Jennifer Law, and Richard M. Walker. 2005. "External Constraints on Local Service Standards: The Case of Comprehensive Performance Assessment in English Local Government." *Public Administration* 83:639-656.
- Arnold, R. Douglas. 1979. *Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence, volume 28*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Audit Commission. 2005. *CPA - The Harder Test*. Local Government Annual Report, October 2005.
- Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon. 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 12:101-121.
- Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. 2005. "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What are the Effects?" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52(7):1245-1269.
- Bevan, Gwyn and Christopher Hood. 2006. "What's Measured is What Matters: Targets and Gaming in the English Public Health Care System." *Public Administration* 84: 517-538.
- Burden, Barry C. and David C. Kimball. 2002. *Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Burch, Patricia, Matthew Steinberg and Joseph Donovan. 2007. "Supplemental Educational Services and NCLB: Policy Assumptions, Market Practices, Emerging Issues." *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 29(2): 115-133.
- Communities and Local Government (CLG), *The English Indices of Deprivation 2007*, London: CLG.
- Courty, Pascal and Gerald Marschke. 2003. "Dynamics of Performance Measurement Systems." *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 19(2): 268-84.
- Courty, Pascal and Gerald Marschke, 2004. "An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives." *Journal of Labor Economics* 22(1): 23-56.
- Cox, Gary W. 2006. "Swing Voters, Core Voters and Distributive Politics." presented at the Conference on Representation and Popular Rule, Yale University.
- Cox, Gary W. and Matthew McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral-Politics as a Redistributive Game." *Journal of Politics* 48:370-389.
- Curtice, John and Michael Steed. 1982. "Electoral Choice and the Production of Government: The Changing Operation of the Electoral System in the United Kingdom since 1955." *British Journal of Political Science* 12: 249-298.
- Dahlberg, Matz and Eva Johansson. 2002. "On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments." *American Political Science Review* 96:27-40.
- Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics* 58:1132-1155.

- Ferejohn, John A. 1974. *Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Game, Chris. 2006. "Comprehensive Performance Assessment in English Local Government." *International Journal of Productivity and Performance Management* 55: 466 - 479.
- Golden, M. and Picci, L. 2008. "Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1992." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2).
- Haubrich, Dirk and Iain McLean. 2006. "Assessing Public Service Performance in Local Authorities Through CPA - A Research Note on Deprivation." *National Institute Economic Review* 197(1):93-105.
- Heckman, James J., Carolyn J. Heinrich and Jeffrey A. Smith. 1997. "Assessing the Performance of Performance Standards in Public Bureaucracies." *American Economic Review* 87(2): 389-395.
- Heckman, James J., Carolyn J. Heinrich and Jeffrey A. Smith. 2002. "The Performance of Performance Standards." *Journal of Human Resources* 37(4): 778-811.
- Hogan, Robert E. 2004. "Challenger Emergence, Incumbent Success, and Electoral Accountability in State Legislative Elections." *Journal of Politics* 66(4): 1283-1303.
- Hood, Christopher, Colin Scott, Oliver James, George W. Jones, and Tony Travers. 1999. *Regulation Inside Government: Waste Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-Busters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks. 2001. *Multi-level Governance and European Integration*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Huber, John, and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion?* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ingraham, Patricia W. and Laurence E. Lynn. 2004. *The Art of Governance: Analyzing Management and Administration*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- James, Oliver and Peter John. 2006. "Public Management at the Ballot Box: Performance Information and Electoral Support for Incumbent English Local Governments." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 17(4): 567-580.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2004. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002." *The World Bank Economic Review* 18(2):253-287.
- Khemani, Stuti. 2007. "Does Delegation of Fiscal Policy to an Independent Agency Make a Difference? Evidence from Intergovernmental Transfers in India." *Journal of Development Economics* 82:464-484.
- Lindbeck, Assar and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. "Balanced Budget Redistribution and the Outcome of Political Competition." *Public Choice* 52: 273-97.
- Linn, Robert L., Eva L. Baker, and Damian W. Betebenner. 2002. "Accountability Systems: Implications of Requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001." *Educational Researcher* 31(6): 3-16.

- Lyne, Mona M. 2008. "Proffering Pork: How Party Leaders Build Party Reputations in Brazil." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 290-303.
- McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3(2): 243-277.
- Miller, William. 1988. *Irrelevant Elections? The Quality of Local Democracy in Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moran, Michael. 2005. *Politics and Governance in the UK*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. The British Parliamentary Constituency Database, 1992-2005. Release 1.3. <<http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Data/Data.htm>>
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2001. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Persson, Torsten and Lars E. O. Svensson. 1989. "Why A Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 104(2): 325-345.
- Pollitt, Christopher and Geert Bouckaert. 2004. *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Prendergast, Canice. 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." *Journal of Economic Literature* 37(1): 7-63.
- Qian, Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11(4):83-92.
- Radin, Beryl A. 2000a. "The Government Performance and Results Act and the Tradition of Federal Management Reform: Square Pegs in Round Holes?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 10(1): 11-35.
- Radin, Beryl A. 2000b. "Intergovernmental Relationships and the Federal Performance Movement." *Publius*. 30(1):143-158.
- Radin, Beryl A.. 2006. *Challenging the Performance Movement*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Revelli, Federico. 2008. "Performance Competition in Local Media Markets." *Journal of Public Economics* 92: 1585-1594.
- Rajkumar, Andrew S., and Vinaya Swaroop. 2008. "Public Spending and Outcomes: Does Governance Matter?" *Journal of Development Economics*. 86(1): 96-111.
- Rundquist, Barry and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. *Congress and Defense Spending: The Distributive Politics of Military Procurement*. Vol. 3. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Small, K., and C. Hsiao. 1985. "Multinomial Logit Specification Tests." *International Economic Review* 26: 619-627.
- Smith, Peter. 1995. "On the Unintended Consequences of Publishing Performance Data in the Public Sector." *International Journal of Public Administration* 18(2&3): 277 - 310.

- Soroka, Stuart N. 2006. "Good News and Bad News: Asymmetric Responses to Economic Information." *The Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 372-85.
- Stasavage, David. 2002. "Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 18: 155-186.
- Stasavage, David and Philip Keefer. 2003. "The Limits of Delegation, Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 407-423.
- Stein, Robert M. and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1995. *Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Strøm, Kaare. 2000. "Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 261-289.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99: 315-325.
- Tabellini, Guido and Alberto F. Alesina. 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit." *American Economic Review* 80(1): 37-49.
- Thacker, Strom C. 1999. "The High Politics of IMF Lending" *World Politics* 52 (1): 38-75.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Unweighted CPA Score	3230	2.85	0.95	1	4
Government Local Council (=1)	3230	0.33	0.47	0	1
Marginal Parliamentary Seat (=1)	3230	0.39	0.49	0	1
Government MP (=1)	3230	0.59	0.49	0	1
Weighted Government Party Vote Share in Local Council Elections (%) [†]	3230	31.71	11.14	4.4	64.4
<i>Audit Commissioner Status</i>					
Current Member of Local Council (=1)	3230	0.08	0.27	0	1
Current Formal Position in Local Authority (=1)	3230	0.07	0.25	0	1
Past Formal Position in Local Authority (=1)	3230	0.00	0.07	0	1
Past Bureaucrat in Local Authority (=1)	3230	0.03	0.16	0	1
Weighted Index of Multiple Deprivation [†]	3230	12.23	8.09	.004	37.68
Weighted Population (thousands) [†]	3230	3.46	3.87	.001	13.30

[†]The unit of analysis is the parliamentary constituency-local authority dyad. Weights record the number of census addresses within the dyad and are applied to continuous variables measured at the local authority level.

Table 2: Political Impacts on CPA Performance Ratings 2002-2006, Stereotype Logistic Regression (SLRM) Results

Variable		Full Model		Audit Commission (AC) indicators omitted	
DV: CPA Score (in LA-PC dyad)					
Gov't Local Council		0.856*	(0.462)	1.078**	(0.439)
Marginal MP		1.200***	(0.402)	1.095***	(0.421)
Gov't MP		-0.233	(0.417)	-0.589	(0.420)
Gov't Vote Share in Local Elections		-0.020	(0.015)	-0.015	(0.015)
Gov't MP*Gov't Vote Share		0.015	(0.022)	0.029	(0.021)
Marginal MP*Gov't Vote Share		-0.051**	(0.022)	-0.045**	(0.021)
Gov't Local Council*Gov't Vote Share		-0.011	(0.020)	-0.001	(0.019)
AC Current Member of Local Council		0.324	(0.395)		
AC Formal Position in Local Authority		2.396***	(0.435)		
AC Past Formal Position in Local Authority		1.226***	(0.404)		
AC Past Bureaucrat in Local Authority		-3.520***	(0.984)		
Weighted Index of Multiple Deprivation		-0.086***	(0.026)	-0.072***	(0.022)
Weighted Population (thousands)		0.627***	(0.061)	0.556***	(0.053)
Year = 2003		0.461***	(0.096)	0.470***	(0.093)
Year = 2004		1.725***	(0.157)	1.775***	(0.150)
Year = 2005		1.771***	(0.187)	1.779***	(0.183)
Year = 2006		2.873***	(0.209)	2.792***	(0.199)
ϕ_1	θ_1	1	0.920 (0.634)	1	1.081* (0.623)
ϕ_2	θ_2	0.610***	1.183*** (0.417)	0.613***	1.205*** (0.412)
ϕ_3	θ_3	0.289***	1.310*** (0.235)	0.367***	1.468*** (0.270)
ϕ_4 (Base)	θ_4 (Base)	0	0	0	0
Number of Observations		3230		3230	
Number of Clusters		639		639	
χ^2 (df)		373.26(17)***		344.09(13)***	
Log Pseudo-likelihood		-3664.760		-3746.302	
White (1982) robust standard errors clustered on LA-PC dyad reported in parentheses. Significance: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01					

Table 3: Predicted Probabilities from Full SLRM

Panel (a): Local Council under Government Control

MP's Party	Local Vote	Marginal MP				Local Vote	Safe MP			
		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4
Gov't (Cells 1,2)	<i>Low</i>	.025	.132	.478	.366	<i>Low</i>	.018	.113	.466	.403
	<i>Mean</i>	.039	.164	.486	.311	<i>Mean</i>	.029	.142	.482	.348
	<i>High</i>	.062	.201	.482	.255	<i>High</i>	.046	.177	.486	.291
	$\Delta L-H$.037	.069	.005	-.111	$\Delta L-H$.029	.064	.012	-.113
Opp'n (Cells 3,4)	<i>Low</i>	.030	.144	.482	.344	<i>Low</i>	.022	.124	.473	.381
	<i>Mean</i>	.047	.178	.486	.290	<i>Mean</i>	.035	.155	.485	.326
	<i>High</i>	.073	.215	.477	.235	<i>High</i>	.055	.191	.485	.270
	$\Delta L-H$.043	.071	-.005	-.109	$\Delta L-H$.033	.067	.011	-.112

Panel (b): Local Council under Opposition Control

MP's Party	Local Vote	Marginal MP				Local Vote	Safe MP			
		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4
Gov't (Cells 5,6)	<i>Low</i>	.060	.197	.483	.260	<i>Low</i>	.044	.173	.486	.296
	<i>Mean</i>	.090	.233	.467	.210	<i>Mean</i>	.068	.201	.479	.243
	<i>High</i>	.133	.268	.436	.163	<i>High</i>	.104	.246	.458	.193
	$\Delta L-H$.074	.071	-.047	-.098	$\Delta L-H$.059	.073	-.029	-.103
Opp'n (Cells 7,8)	<i>Low</i>	.070	.211	.478	.240	<i>Low</i>	.053	.187	.485	.275
	<i>Mean</i>	.105	.247	.457	.192	<i>Mean</i>	.080	.223	.473	.224
	<i>High</i>	.153	.280	.421	.146	<i>High</i>	.120	.259	.446	.175
	$\Delta L-H$.083	.069	-.058	-.094	$\Delta L-H$.068	.072	-.039	-.100

Appendix (Not for Publication): Predicted Probabilities from Full SLRM, excluding 2006

Panel (a): Local Council under Government Control

MP's Party	Local Vote	Marginal MP					Local Vote	Safe MP				
		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4	CPA=5		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4	CPA=5
Gov't (Cells 1,2)	Low	.001	.026	.120	.481	.373	Low	.001	.019	.101	.470	.409
	Mean	.003	.049	.172	.486	.289	Mean	.002	.038	.148	.487	.325
	High	.010	.088	.230	.462	.211	High	.006	.069	.204	.477	.244
	Δ L-H	.009	.062	.110	-.019	-.162	Δ L-H	.005	.050	.103	.006	-.165
Opp'n (Cells 3,4)	Low	.001	.028	.125	.482	.364	Low	.001	.021	.105	.473	.400
	Mean	.004	.053	.178	.485	.281	Mean	.002	.040	.153	.488	.316
	High	.011	.093	.236	.457	.203	High	.007	.073	.210	.474	.236
	Δ L-H	.010	.065	.111	-.025	-.161	Δ L-H	.006	.053	.105	.001	-.164

Panel (b): Local Council under Opposition Control

MP's Party	Local Vote	Marginal MP					Local Vote	Safe MP				
		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4	CPA=5		CPA=1	CPA=2	CPA=3	CPA=4	CPA=5
Gov't (Cells 5,6)	Low	.006	.067	.200	.478	.249	Low	.004	.051	.175	.486	.284
	Mean	.017	.114	.258	.436	.174	Mean	.011	.091	.234	.486	.206
	High	.044	.179	.303	.363	.111	High	.029	.149	.287	.398	.137
	Δ L-H	.038	.112	.103	-.115	-.138	Δ L-H	.025	.098	.111	-.088	-.147
Opp'n (Cells 7,8)	Low	.007	.071	.206	.475	.241	Low	.004	.055	.181	.485	.276
	Mean	.019	.121	.264	.430	.167	Mean	.012	.097	.240	.454	.198
	High	.048	.186	.307	.354	.106	High	.032	.156	.291	.390	.131
	Δ L-H	.041	.115	.100	-.122	-.135	Δ L-H	.028	.101	.110	-.095	-.145