Expert Information, Public Deliberation, and Electoral Support for "Good" Governance: Experimental Evidence from Benin

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Abstract

This paper provides experimental evidence on the combined effect of expert information and public deliberation on electoral support for programmatic, non-clientelist platforms. The experiment takes place in Benin and involves real candidates running in the first round of the 2006 presidential elections. The treatment to be evaluated is a two-stage public deliberation process designed to generate programmatic, and non targeted electoral platforms. The first stage involves political parties and is led by policy experts. The second stage which draws from the outcome of the first stage, involves voters and is led by party activists. We find that (1) turnout was higher in treatment villages than in the control villages. In addition, the treatment has a positive and significant effect on both voting for and trust in the candidate running the experiment. The results remain unchanged after controlling for ethnic ties, education, and some measure of income. We argue that political parties can overcome the need for distributing fa-

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vors in order to win votes, by improving the extent to which their policy promises are informed by empirical research.

INTRODUCTION

Economists and policy analysts increasingly acknowledge the crucial role of universal policies such as public education in promoting growth and reducing inequalities [1]. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that medical coverage of children with malaria significantly reduce the gap in child mortality rate between poor and rich households and that good public schools are key in narrowing the gap in reading skills between high and low ability students [2]. Following Lizzeri and Persico [2004], one might expect more growth and equity promoting policies to emerge in low income countries as they become more democratic. Yet, despite democratic change in Africa, there is evidence of widespread government failure in generating broad and universal public policies (Keefer [2007]. The reason is simple: even in well-functioning democracies, policies are not selected on the basis of their contribution to growth and development by a social planner or a benevolent philosopher-king. Instead, they are selected by politicians on the basis of their electoral appeals (Dixit and Londregan [1996] and Lizzeri and Persico [2001] among others). Furthermore, when voters are divided along ethnic lines or are uninformed, inefficient and clientelistic policies might be preferred to "programmatic," well-conceived and broad policies (Wantchekon [2003], Easterly and Levine [1997]). In addition, accountability mechanisms seem to work better with targeted, clientelist promises than programmatic, broad based public goods promises.[3]

The questions are: can programmatic platforms ever be electorallly effective? What institutional innovation or democratic reform can help mitigate clientelist practices? One possible solution that has recently been discussed in the literature, is " access to information". Wantchekon and Vermeersh [2007] find evidence that respondents who have more

[1] St-Paul and Verdier [1993] for the effect of public education on growth. See also López-Casasnovas et al [2005], Sala-I-Martin [2002], Howitt [2005] for a survey of the literature on health and development.

[2] See a cross country comparision in Early Grade Reading Assessement (EGRA) conducted by RTI international.

[3] For instance, Keefer and Vlacu [2006] present a model in which politicians in new democracies who have credibility deficit can reduce this deficit either through repeated interactions or through targeted transfers. They show that in equilibrium, politicians will prefer targeted transfers and this leads to a high level of corruption and low level of public goods. An implicit assumption is that, politicians' lack of credibility make voters prefer targeted transfers to public goods.

access to media outlets (radio, and newspapers) have a less negative response to public goods platforms. This evidence is indicative of the role of information in improving the electoral appeal of non-clientelist platforms. However, it is unclear whether the information effect is causal, since access to media was not randomly assigned in the 2001 Benin experiment. Perhaps those with better media access were more informed about the candidates, their platforms and about governments. They may also be more educated and wealthy. The goal of this paper is to isolate the effect of information regarding programmatic public goods platforms on voting.

There have been several attempts in contemporary political science to provide empirical evidence of the effect of increased policy knowledge on voting. The political ignorance literature in American politics indicates that increased policy information affect policy preferences and voting behavior. In particular, Gilens [2001] find that the dissemination of facts on crime rate and foreign aid have a significant effect on policy preferences and political judgements. However, the results generated in these studies are based on US data and it is unclear if the information effect would transcend ethnic or religious cleavages, or if the effect would be of the same magnitude given the low level of formal education in most developing countries.

Another important contribution to debate on the political effect of information is the literature on deliberation. Gutman and Thompson [1996] and Fishkin [1997] find that public deliberation promotes "enlightenment", consensus, and civic engagement. One limitation of this literature is that it is mostly theoretical and the evidence that it provides comes from deliberative polls and focus groups, rather than from the field. As a result, it is unclear how policy information provided in the context public deliberation would affect voting behavior in real elections.

This paper also contributes to the literature on media access, political institutions and local public goods. Olken [2008] provides experimental evidence from Indonesia that suggests that direct elections are better than representative-based meetings in generating popular satisfaction and support for local public goods. Reinikka and Svensson [2005] find that media access reduces local capture of public funds and subsequently leads to higher school enrollment and test scores. However, these studies focus on local public goods and ignore political incentives at national level.

The methodology, the context and the findings of 2001 The results of the Benin experiment reported in Wantchekon [2003] are particularly relevant the current study. That

experiment aimed at testing the effectiveness of clientelist versus programmatic electoral campaigns on voting. The experiment consisted of randomized trials in 24 villages in which politicians used either clientelist, programmatic, or neutral election campaign. The results suggested that the clientelist electoral campaign is more effective, and that the programmatic election campaign costs votes. However, women, more informed voters and co-ethnics of the candidate running the experiment were more responsive to programmatic platforms than men, less informed voters, and non co-ethnics (respectively). One question that arises from that study is whether clientelism is the only effective electoral campaign strategy. Indeed, it could be well the case that the lack of electoral support for programmatic platforms compared to clientelist platforms was due to its use of overly "general"and vague campaign messages such as:

> "Our party stands for democracy and national solidarity. If elected, our candidate will engage in a nationwide reform of the education and the health care system In conjunction with other opposition leaders, he will fight corruption and promote peace between all ethnic groups and all the regions of our country."

The question is: would the results have been different if the candidate running the experiment have made specific and informed policy promises such as:" if elected I will provide full medical insurance for all HIV patients" or "free primary education in all rural schools"?

We address this question by providing evidence from a follow up to the 2001 Benin experiment. As in that experiment, it took place in Benin and involves real candidates running in real elections (the first round of the 2006 presidential race). However, in this case, there is only one treatment (the programmatic platform). That platform was derived from voters' known policy priorities (expressed in a pre-election survey) and from the proceedings of a national policy conference. The conference involved academics, policy experts, all major candidates and political parties represented in the National Assembly. The campaign messages were later run and amended through town meetings and the control units received the "regular" standard message.

We find that turnout was higher in treatment villages than in the control villages. In addition, the treatment has a positive and significant effect on both voting for and trust in the candidate running the experiment. The results remain unchanged after controlling for ethnic ties, education, and income. In other words, information has an effect on voting for programmatic policies despite ethnic cleavages and low education. We conclude that

political parties can overcome the need to win votes by targeting or even distributing largesse to a set of voters by improving the extent to which their policy promises are informed by empirical policy research. To put it differently, policy targeting and policy specificity may be substitutes and one may contain electoral clientelism by institutionalizing the use of policy expertise in the design of electoral platforms.

A SIMPLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical framework of the experiment is an extension of a model of redistributive politics developed by Lindbeck and Weibull. (1987) and later by Dixit and Londregan [200x] We consider a redistributive model with two parties, a Western Party W and an Eastern Party E and N groups of voters. We assume that parties only care about winning and that voters have preference over consumption (i.e. transfers and public goods) and ideology or identity. Each of the N groups in the political community has the same mass of individuals $\frac{1}{N}$. We also assume as in Lizzeri and Persico [2004] that each citizen is endowed with ω_i units of consumption goods, so that the aggregate resources in the economy is given by $\omega = \sum \frac{1}{N}\omega_i$ Government can tax individual endowment to its maximum and taxation in non-distortionary, so that only the aggregate level of resources in the country matter, not its distribution.

Each voter has ethnic affiliations and is assumed to care about the fact that a member of his or her ethnic group or someone relatively close to his or her ethnic group is elected.[4] We define by x the level of ethnic attachment of a voter, where x is the realization of a random variable X with cumulative distribution function $F$and density f. The parties, W and E compete for election, making to each group a binding promise of a transfer y_i and level of public good G. That means the promises are not tailored to the level of ethnic attachment of the voter (which is not observed) but to his to her group.

A voter x votes for W if

$$U(y_i^E, G^E) - U(y_i^W, G^W) > x$$

Thus the probability that group i voter votes for the E, given the menu of transfers, and the level public goods is:

[4] The voter might also dislike the fact that a candidate from a specific ethnolinguistic origin is elected.

$$F\left(U(y_i^E, G^E\right) - U\left((y_i^W, G^W\right).$$

The total vote share of the Eastern party is given by

$$\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} F\left(U(y_i^E, G^E\right) - U\left((y_i^W, G^W\right)$$

The vote share of the Western Party is $(1 - S_L)$

Given the W's platform, E would chose its own platform to maximize its vote share, subject to the non-negativity constraints:. i.e.

$$G^E \geq 0; \text{ and } y_i^E \geq 0$$

as well as the aggregate budget constraint

$$\omega \geq G^E + \sum y_i^E$$

We assume that voters perfectly observe the promises made to members of their respective group, but has an imperfect knowledge about transfers made to members of other groups. In other words, *there is no transparency* over the level of aggregate transfers and therefore over the level of public goods.[5] We want to show that provision of public goods is more likely, when politicians are more transparent. We first analyze the no transparency case and then move to the full transparency case.

- **The no transparency case**

Since there is imperfect information on the level of aggregate transfers, voting decisions will be based on beliefs about the parties' offers to other groups and hence the level of public good that will provide, once in office Given the beliefs, parties will choose the optimal provision of public goods in order to maximize their vote share. Assume the offer to group i by E is y_i^E. The only consistent belief for voters is that, E will offer no public good once in office. Given this belief, parties will solve for transfers allocation that maximize transfers under the non-negativity and resource constraints, leading to $G^E = G^W = 0$

[5] This is special case a more general model of transparency in policy-making developed by Gavazza and Lizzeri [2008]

- **The Full transparency case.**

In this case the parties can credibly announce a level of public provision of public good and are fully transparent about the level of transfers to other groups. In contrast with the no-transparency case, voters believe that public goods will be provided with probability 1. and parties will maximize their vote share under the non-negativity and resource constraints. Thus, there will a positive amount of public good and consequently less transfers for each group than in the no-transparency case.

In summary, expert information and public deliberation generate more transparency over public policies and therefore increase voters belief in the technical and political feasibility of public policies programmes. As a result, they become more electorallly responsive to platforms advocating these programmes. Our experimental evidence suggests that this responsiveness translates into higher turnout and more votes for the candidate in treatment villages than control villages. But before we provide details of the experimental design and the results, we introduce its context.

CONTEXT

The experiment took place in Benin (formerly Dahomey), a West African country located between Togo and Nigeria, with a population of about 8 millions. Benin was colonized by France in 1894 but gained independence in 1960. The first twelve post-independence years were characterized by political instability with alternation of civilian and military rule. The country experienced its fifth and last military coup in 1972. The coup paved the way for a dictatorial regime led by Mathieu Kerekou, that lasted for 18 years.

Benin has achieved a successful transition since 1989 from a Leftist dictatorship towards a pluralist democracy .Since then, democratic institutions have been strengthened with 4 presidential elections in which incumbents lost twice.[6] There has been high turnover in the National Assembly. In 2006, the country ranked 2nd in Africa and 26th in the World in terms of freedom of the press by "Reporters without Borders."

Despite progress towards democratic consolidation, economic performance has been very weak. According to the Benin Country Memorandum published by the World Bank in 2008,

[6] Presidents are elected through plurality with a runoff. That is, if no candidate reaches a majority during the first round, a second round is organized for the top two candidates on the list and the plurality winner is elected.

the country has lower per-capita growth rate, and weaker institutional performance (law enforcement, regulatory agencies, government effectiveness) than other African democracies. Corruption is rampant and the country is ranked very low in terms governance index (37th in Africa). The 2006 presidential elections were the first since 1990, without the traditional "big men" Mathieu Kerekou and Nicephore Soglo. They were ineligible to run under the age limits and term limits set by the constitution. There were twenty six candidates competing in the election, but only four were serious contenders capable of securing more than two percent of the vote. The top two candidates were Yayi Boni, a former President of the West African Development Bank, running as an independent candidate but supported by a coalition of small parties, and Adrien Houngbedji a cabinet member under Kerekou Government, and the candidate of the Party for Democratic Renewal (PRD). The other serious candidates with some outside chance of making to the second round, were Amoussou Bruno of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Lehadi Soglo, the son of former president Nicephore Soglo, and the candidate of Renaissance du Benin (RB). As in previous elections, there were no distinguishable differences between candidates in terms of platforms but they tended to appeal to voters from their ethnic groups and regions to get more votes. The main theme of election: better governance with strong anti-corruption measures and better public services[7]

As indicated in Wantchekon [2003], Benin presents a number of advantages for political experiments. It is considered one of the most successful cases of democratization in Africa. Thus, elections are meaningful and voters' policy preferences can be inferred from their behavior at the polls. Benin is perceived by many political scientists as the "democracy laboratory of Africa" because of its long tradition of political experimentation.[8]Benin also has the advantage of a relatively weak interregional disparity in key socioeconomic indicators.[9]

[7]See Gisselquist [2006]) for detailed report and analysis of the election. See also Banegas [1998] for a study on clientelism in Benin.

[8]For instance, the political leaders in Benin were the first to introduce the rotating presidency formula to curb ethnic strife in 1969. The formula was later adopted by leaders of former Yugoslavia in 1980 following Tito's death. Benin also invented the national conference formula in 1989 as a way of facilitating a peaceful post-authoritarian transition (Boulaga [1993])

[9]Note, however, that Mono has the best education outcomes despite having the most overcrowded classrooms.

THE EXPERIMENT

The experiment investigates the effect of expert information and specific policy proposals on voting outcomes. The treatment to be evaluated is a two-stage public deliberation process designed to generate a programmatic, and non targeted electoral platform. The first stage involves political parties and is led by policy experts. The second stage draws from the outcome of the first stage and involves voters and is led by party activists. Thus the treatment is a process or game form, more precisely a political mechanism for generating political platforms or campaign messages. The treatment is NOT a pre-designed, pre-crafted platform or a vignette that would be read to voters. To put it differently, we are investigating voters's response to a specific, randomly assigned mechanism for generating electoral platforms (expert-led public deliberation), not voters' response to a specific randomly assigned platform.[10]

The experimental process started with a policy conference that took place on December 22, 2005, entitled "Elections 2006: What policy alternatives?". There were about forty participants and four panels (Education, Public Health, Governance, and Urban Planning). Four policy experts wrote reports describing government performance in those four areas and outlined recommendations based on academic research and best practice in policy implementation. [11] All the parties represented at the National Assembly were represented at the conference. There were also representatives of several NGOs and officials from the European Union, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (a cosponsor of the event along with the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy in Benin). The proceedings of the conference can be download from *www.ireep.org* and the final report is in the appendix.

The final report contains a wide range of policy proposals such as community-funded health insurance, school based management, and random audits of politicians and other anti-corruption measures in the spirit of Svensson and Reinikka [2003].

After the conference several political parties and candidates volunteered to experiment

[10] Another example of a randomized evaluation of political mechanism is Benjamin Olken (2008) study of the comparative effect of direct elections representative-based meetings on popular satisfaction and support for local public goods.

[11] The four experts were Professor Leonard Fourn who teaches Public Health at the University of Abomey Calavi, Dr. Hamissou Oumarou, Education Expert from Niger, Dr Mouftaou Laleye, who taught Public administration at the University of IFE in Nigeria, and Mr Todjinou Jean Bosco, and architect and Urban Planning specialist.

with the proposed campaign strategies. Together, these parties represent a projected 85% of the electorate. There are: Union pour la Democratie et la Solidarite (UDS), Impulsion pour le Progres et la Democratie (IPD), Congres Africain pour le Progres (CAP-SURU), Renaissance du Benin (RB), Parti Social Democrate du Benin (PSD), Parti du Renouveau Democratique (PRD).

In the presence of representatives of each party, we selected 8 districts or communes of a total of 77. In each of the selected communes, we put together the list of all villages. There is an average of 50 villages per commune. We randomly pick 'two villages that were at least 10 kilometers apart. The first village will be assigned to the treatment group and the other one to the control group. The distance requirement helps limit threats to internal validity, and a mix up of treatment and control groups. The aggregate population under treatment is 10239 registered voters and the population in the control group is about 280, 404.

Once assignment of electoral districts to treatments and control were completed, there were pre-electoral surveys on policy priorities of voters and in the treatment units. Finally, teams of campaign workers were instructed with specific policy responses to voters concerns on the quality of public schools, youth employment, malaria prevention, etc...They were also given specific instructions on how to run the town meetings: First, they introduce themselves and the candidate they are representing. Then they give a fifteen minutes speech on the key problems facing the country and the specific solution suggested by the candidate. The speech triggers an open debate in which the issues raised are contextualized, and the proposals made are amended by the participants. The meeting would last about ninety minutes to about two hours. The teams would run 6 to10 such meetings over two weeks in each village. There were about 50 to 200 participants in each town meetings and treated villages ranged 360 to 2926 occupants. In our estimation, at 70% of the population of each village attended one or more town meetings.

While villages in treatment groups received and deliberated over informed and broad-based policy proposals, villages in the control groups received and deliberated over a mixture of targeted or clientelist campaign promises as well as broad but less informed policy promises.

There were no major differences between treatment and control groups in terms of exposure and intensity of political campaigns. First, in each group and each village, there were eight to ten meetings and second, campaign workers in the treatment group have about same level of education as the ones in control villages (about 2 years of college). Finally,

campaign workers in treatment groups were not more motivated than the ones in control groups. In fact, teams in control villages could well be more motivated because they were better paid and had closer contacts with the candidates.

After the elections, we collected data on turnout in treatment and control precincts from the National Electoral Commission. We also surveyed a representative sample in each group on demographic variables (age, gender, marital status, ethnic affiliation), socioeconomic variables (educational attainment, economic activities and assets) and political variables (preferences over candidates and voting behavior).

THE DATA AND THE RESULTS

INTERNAL VALIDITY AND COMPLIANCE

We first verify the effectiveness of randomization in generating balanced covariates. More precisely, we test the null hypothesis of no significant difference between the means of pre-treatment variables in the treatment group and the control group. Table I indicate that all covariates are balanced across groups, with the exception of education and to a lesser degree newspaper readership. In other words, voters in treatment groups are, on average, more educated than those in the control group. But there is no significant difference in terms of gender, age, ethnic ties, and radio use. Therefore, in estimating the treatment effect, we need to control to for education.

Insert Table 1A here

Next, as a check of internal validity, we investigate whether voters exposed through public deliberation to expert policy information were indeed more informed than those in the control groups.

Table IB indicate that a significantly larger number of respondents in the treatment group described the campaign as informative, in comparison with the control group: 65.6% in treatment group as opposed to 58.9% in the control group. In addition, a higher percentage of respondents in treatment areas claim to know more about the candidate running the experiment, about the way the government works, and about the problems facing the country. Thus, the treatment was effective in making treated voters feel there were more informed.

Insert Table 1B here

Besides evidence on information treatment, another question of interest is whether voters in treatment groups were less involved in clientelist practices. Table 1A suggest that a lower proportion of voters in treatment villages receive cash during the campaign than in control villages (17% to 20%). However, there is no significant difference across groups in terms of those who received T-shirts (20% to 21%), or calenders (72.1% to 72.7%).

TURNOUT

We now turn to the central goal of the project which is to identify the effect of information on turnout, voting for and trust in the candidate running the experiment. The turnout data was collected at various voting booths right after all the votes were counted. Later, we confirmed the results at the office of the electoral commission. The data on electoral behavior and trust in the candidate originated from a survey that took place 5 days after the election.

Tables 2A turnout levels across treatment and control groups. The table suggests that turnout was significantly higher in treatment villages versus control villages in six of the seven cases. There is a full 8.20% difference in turnout levels between treatment versus control villages. There is only one case (district of Comè) in which the treatment village (70%) has a smaller turnout than the control village (77%).

Insert Table 2A

VOTING

Table 2B use data collected from the electoral commission on outcome of the vote in treatment and control villages. Overall, the experimental candidates garnered 66.7% of the vote in the treatment villages, compared with 60.7% in the control villages. In one commune, Kandi, the results were approximately the same for the experimental and control villages. In four out of seven cases, the experimental candidate gained more votes in the treatment. The treatment effect was particularly strong in Gadome I and Yaoui. In two districts out of seven the experimental candidates fared better in the control villages. In the Commune of Kouande, the experimental candidate gained a slightly higher percentage of votes in the control versus treatment group. This may be explained by an unexpected rally

by the experimental candidate, Yayi Boni, held in the control district a few days before the Presidential election.

Table 3 presents the analysis of voting behavior. The dependent variable is voting, which takes a value of 1 if the respondent voted for the experimental candidate in the 2006 election and zero if the respondent did not. The model controls for age, gender, level of educational attainment, ethnic ties with candidate, income level, media access, and a measure of civic involvement. Income level was measured by using an index of housing quality, constructed from factor analysis of five independent variables (roofing, ground, number of rooms, material of home etc...). The key independent variable is treatment, which takes the value of one if the respondent was in the treatment group and zero if the respondent was in the control group. We present the results for several variants of the model, one which includes candidate fixed effects.

The results suggest that the treatment effect is positive and significant across all specifications of the model. In specifications 3,4, and 5 of the model, ethnic ties is positive and significant, which indicates that under these specifications, respondents are significantly more likely to vote for a candidate from their ethnic group. Education level, gender and age are insignificant in all specifications.

Insert Table 2B and Table 3

TRUST AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES.—

In other to test the robustness of the treatment effect on voting, we consider two other measures of political behavior that are correlated with voting preferences: trust and political preference. In the survey voters were asked whether they trust the candidate. The trust variable is coded as 1 for a "yes" response and 0 for a "no" response. In the survey, the respondent were also asked to name their 3 preferred candidates in the election. The top candidate is coded as 1 and any other candidate is coded as 0. Table 5 presents the results. The treatment effect was positive and significant in all specifications of the model. The results and magnitude of the treatment effect are very similar obtained with the voting data, which is probably to due to the fact the three variables (voting, preference and trust) are highly correlated.

Insert Table 4 and 5 here

IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

We show that a two stage public deliberation over policies led by experts can improve electoral support for those policies. A candidate can win more votes and be more trusted by the electorate if they were to switch to platforms informed by research and best practice and communicate these platforms through town meetings. If a given policy is known by both voters and politicians to be both welfare improving and electorally effective, then that policy is more likely to be adopted by politicians as electoral platforms and more likely to be implemented once the politician is in office. Therefore, one should take advantage of advances in liberal democracy and improved political autonomy of civil society in Africa to push for institutional change that allows for more "public deliberation" over policy choice and better use of expert policy information generated by academics and development agencies. This is because, as we show in this paper, public deliberation informed by "serious" policy research can help improve civic engagement, and electoral support for "good" governance, and hence make selection and implementation of "good" policies more likely. One may achieve this goal by institutionalizing the generation and use of expert policy information by parties, governments and civil society organizations.

It might therefore be helpful to set up in every African country a "council of experts" a permanent and independent academic type institution to advise and assist political parties, and the government in designing and evaluating policies, and in setting development priorities. This institution would similar to the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), but with different focus. It could also be like Brookings and NBER but would have broader mandate.

The idea of council of expert as an institutional response to policy failure in democracies is very similar to and to some extent inspired by the "smart board" suggestion made by Mr Andy Rooney. in 2005. Responding to popular criticisms of the Bush Administration policy in Iraq, Mr Rooney, a commentator, on CBS news magazine, "60 minutes", suggested the creation of a "Smart Board", where college professors would advise and speak out publicly on major policy decisions. According to Mr. Rooney, members of the "Smart Board" would be elected for a two-years term by all college professors. Board members would talk things over, and give their best advice to Congress and to the President. He added "It would not compulsory for them to take it. But the board opinion would be made public and that would put pressure on politicians". This rather wild proposal was treated as a funny

joke by television audience in US has the merit of pointing to quite seriously to the role of "expert" knowledge in democratic politics and the need to institutionalize non-partisan policy expertise.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

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Table 1A: Summary Statistics

Variable	Oberv.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Control Mean	Experimental Mean
Age	2132	41.91	14.68	41.69	42.11
Gender Male=1	2153	.50	.50	.50	.49
Went to school=1	2153	.34	.47	.47	.48
Education level	2153	.45	.70	.42	.49**
Radio=1	2153	.87	.34	.87	.87
Television=1	2153	.14	.35	.13	.15
Newspaper=1	2153	.03	.17	.02	.04*
Ethnic ties with candidate	2153	.59	.49	.57	.61

Note: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 %

Table 1 B. Internal Validity and Compliance

Variable	Control	Experim.
T-shirt	.202	.217
Calendar	.721	.727
Cash	.201	.171
Informative campaign?	.589	.656
Inf. about candidates	.461	.53
Inf. about issues	.326	.383
Inf. about government	.193	.205

Table 2A: Turnout

Commune	Village	Party	Status	Vote sh.	Total
Kandi	Thya	UDS	T	71.5	601
			C	72.8	29,524
Bembereke	Mani	UDS	T	64.3	193
			C	73.3	24,007
Ouesse	Yaoui	CAP	T	80.4	1,495
			C	62.7	24,186
Save	Okounfo	CAP	T	72.0	713
			C	61.6	20,314
Come	Gadome I	UPD	T	54.3	578
			C	32.3	8,500
Dangbo	Mitro	PRD	T	59.4	413
			C	54.1	2509
Kouande	Orou-Kayo	UPD	T	60.7	482
			C	**68.3**	17160

Table 2B: VOTE

Commune	Village	Party	Status	Vote sh.	Total
Kandi	Thya	UDS	T	71.5	601
			C	72.8	29,524
Bembereke	Mani	UDS	T	64.3	193
			C	73.3	24,007
Ouesse	Yaoui	CAP	T	80.4	1,495
			C	62.7	24,186
Save	Okounfo	CAP	T	72.0	713
			C	61.6	20,314
Come	Gadome I	UPD	T	54.3	578
			C	32.3	8,500
Dangbo	Mitro	PRD	T	59.4	413
			C	54.1	2509
Kouande	Orou-Kayo	UPD	T	60.7	482
			C	**68.3**	17160
ALL			T	**66.7**	4475
			C	**60.7**	126200

Table 3: Voting behavior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	.35***	.26***	.34***	.36***	.66**
Ethnic ties	-	-.04	.16*	.16*	.64***
Gender (male=1)	-	.07	-.11	-.09	-.03
Age	-	.002	.002	.002	.002
Education Level	-	-.05	-.03	-.0009	-.04
Housing	-	-	-	.09*	.11
Discussion	-	-	-	.07*	.15**
Media	-	-	-	-.04	.11
Membership	-	-	-	-.03	-.03
Treatment*Ethnic ties	-	-	-	-	-.88***
Treatment*Gender	-	-	-	-	.15
Treatment*Education	-	-	-	-	.06
Treatment*Housing	-	-	-	-	-.10
Treatment*Discussion	-	-	-	-	-.19**
Treatment*Media	-	-	-	-	-.23
Observations	2153	2132	2132	2084	2084
Pseudo R^2	.39	.01	.39	.39	.40
Candidate Fixed Effect	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The estimation method is probit. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 %

Table 4: Trust and Treatment

	(1)	(2)
Treatment	0.19***	0.23***
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Ethnic ties	-	-0.18**
		(0.08)
Gender (male=1)	-	-0.01
		(0.07)
Age	-	-0.001
		(0.002)
Media	-	-0.08
		(0.07)
Housing	-	0.13***
		(0.05)
Discussion		0.11***
		(0.04)
Membership		0.05
		(0.04)
	-	(0.09)
Constant	0.12	-0.91***
	(0.28)	(0.16)
Pseudo R^2	0.004	0.35
Observations	2153	2084
Candidate fixed effects?	No	Yes

Table 5: Favorite Candidate and Treatment

	(1)	(2)
Treatment	0.19***	0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Ethnic ties		0.04
		(0.08)
Gender (male=1)		0.03
		(0.07)
Age		0.000
		(0.002)
Media	-	-0.06
		(0.07)
Housing	-	0.10*
		(0.05)
Discussion		0.11***
		(0.04)
Membership		0.06
		(0.04)
	-	(0.11)
Constant	0.14***	-1.25***
	(0.04)	(0.17)
Pseudo R^2	0.004	0.41
Observations	2153	2084
Candidate fixed effects?	No	Yes

Note: The estimation method is probit. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1 %; Standard error in parentheses